THE INTERSTATE COMPACT-A DEVICE FOR
CRIME REPRESSION
GORDON DnAN*

Certain legal concepts have quite naturally grown out of the employment of
boundary lines between private tracts of land and between political sovereignties.
Along with these concepts corollary notions have also developed which may be
likened to the rules by which the old game of "cop and robber" was kept within
bounds-rules which guarantee to the fugitive criminal, in certain instances, complete immunity and sanctuary in the midst of a feverish chase. The claim of the
child which finds expression in "You can't tag me here," is not unlike the claim of
the criminal who takes advantage of the boundaries which separate villages, townships, cities, counties, states, and nations.
The interstate compact in no way involves the eradication of boundaries. It does,
however, offer a simple method for discarding those incidents of boundaries which
have no justification except from the standpoint of the criminal who profits by their
retention.
Boundary rivers have always been a favorite gathering point for criminals; and
this was particularly true of the territorial boundary line between the States of Mississippi and Arkansas, which, for many miles, is the center of the main channel of the
Mississippi River. If one state forbade gambling, for instance, and the other sanctioned it, a river boat would leave the former's shore, cross the middle of the main
channel, and suddenly become transformed into a gala gambling ship. The sanctity
of that narrow thread in the main channel rendered impotent the enforcement officials of the state whose laws were being so ingeniously circumvented. If the state
which permitted gambling passed a liquor law and the state which forbade gambling
did not, the river boat turned on its motors, crossed back to the other side of the
main channel, and opened up its saloon. Even where both states had identical laws
relating to gambling, liquor control and other subjects, criminals, by operating close
to the middle of the channel, made it difficult for a prosecutor in either state to
establish exactly in which jurisdiction the offense was committed. In other words,
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identical substantive criminal laws would not solve the problem which the proof of
venue raised.
When it was suggested by some that there was no reason why the laws of both
states should not be made effective over the entire river, even when such laws

conflicted, others pointed to the territorial boundary which seemed, according to
traditional boundary concepts, an insurmountable barrier to concurrent jurisdiction.
It was evident that co~perative effort on the part of both states was needed. Mississippi and Arkansas, therefore, entered into a compact 1 which literally, at least for
the purpose of enforcing the laws of the respective states, extended the western
boundary of Mississippi to the western shore of the Mississippi River, and the eastern
boundary of Arkansas to the eastern shore of the same river.
These two states had few precedents for their action. In all the years since the
insertion in the Constitution of the United States of a provision which declared that
"No State shall, without the consent of Congress ... enter into any Agreement or
Compact with another State . . :,2 only eight such compacts have been approved
by Congress in the field of criminal law and procedure, 3 and only two of these
preceded the compact just described. Many compacts have been entered into in other
fields, such as the control and improvement of navigation, conservation of natural
resources, utility regulation, taxation, boundaries and cessions of territories, etc. 4 All
of the compacts in the crime field have been restricted to the service of criminal
process on, or the jurisdiction over, boundary waters. Most of these compacts have
provided for concurrent jurisdiction over such boundary waters. Similar grants of
concurrent jurisdiction over boundary waters are also to be found in a number of
congressional acts which admits states to the Union and which at the same time
establish the boundaries for such states.' The legal problems which have arisen out
'35 STAT. 1161 (19o9).
'U. S. CONST., art. 1, §10, cl.3.

'Compacts in the crime field which have been approved by Congress under the compact clause of the
Constitution:
(i) New York and New Jersey (1833). Re: jurisdiction over the Hudson River. 4 STAT. 708.
(2) New Jersey and Delaware (1907). Re: jurisdiction and service of penal process on the Delaware River. 34 STAT. 858.

(3)Mississippi and Louisiana (19o9).

Re: penal jurisdiction over the boundary waters of the

Mississippi river. 35 STAT. 1161.
(4) Mississippi and Arkansas (19o9).

Re: penal jurisdiction over the boundary waters of the

Mississippi river. 35 STAT. 1161.
(5) Arkansas and Tennessee (i909). Same as above. 35 STAT. 1163.
(6) Missouri and Kansas (sgso). Same as above. 35 STAT. 1163.
(7) Wisconsin, Illinois, Indiana and Michigan (191o).
Re: criminal jurisdiction over the waters

of Lake Michigan. 36 STAT. 882.
(8) South Dakota, North Dakota, Minnesota, Wisconsin, Iowa, Nebraska (1921). 41 STAT. 1447.
'See Frankfurter & Landis, The Compact Clause of the Constitution-A Study in Interstate Adjustments (1925) 34 YALx L. J. 685.
(I) The Act to admit Iowa as a state (1845). 5 STAT. 743.
(2) The Act to admit Wisconsin as a state (846). 9 STAT. 57.
(3) The Act to admit Minnesota as a state (1857). 11 STAT. x66.
(4) The Act to admit Oregon as a state (1859). 1I STAT. 383.
(5)The Act to admit Missouri as a state (182o). 3 STAT. 545.
(6)

The Act to admit Illinois as a state (1818). 3 STAT. 428, at 429.
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of these grants of concurrent jurisdiction, whether the grant appears in a compact
or whether it appears in the act admitting a state to the Union, have not been many,"
and apparently the exercise of concurrent criminal jurisdiction by bordering states,

with one possible exception,7 has not brought on any major clashes between the
states. A short discussion of these problems is relegated to the footnotes."

It has

only been in very recent years that persons have become aware that there is a large
body of problems in the criminal law field which are non-local in character and
which at the same time do not justify federal intervention or control-problems that

are beyond the power of a single state to control. In the Seventy-third Congress the
so-called Interstate Compact Bill was enacted. This statute0 provides:
That the consent of Congress is hereby given to any two or more States to enter into
agreements or compacts for co6perative effort and mutual assistance in the prevention of
crime and in the enforcement of their respective criminal laws and policies, and to establish
such agencies, joint or otherwise, as they may deem desirable for making effective such
agreements and compacts.

In the report of the House Judiciary Committee which accompanied this Bill'

it

was stated:
This bill seeks to remove the obstruction imposed by the Federal Constitution and
allow the states co~peratively and by mutual agreement to work out their problems of law
enforcement.
'See note 8, infra.
' The States of Washington and Oregon have indulged in considerable litigation concerning the
Columbia River, which is the boundary line between the two states. In one case involving a dispute
between these states, which reached the United States Supreme Court, Washington v. Oregon, 214 U. S.
205, 29 Sup. Ct. 631 (i9og), the Court deviated from the question at hand long enough to set forth
in full in its opinion the compact between the States of Arkansas and Mississippi, and suggested at p.
633: "We submit to the States of Oregon and Washington whether it would not be wise for them to
pursue the same course."
' Two situations have given rise to appellate court interpretations of such statutes.
s. Where the laws of State B definitely sanction conduct punishable by the neighboring State A,
across the river, and an arrest is made by officers of A on the B side of the river.
2. Where State A attempts to prosecute for crime committed on an object on the B side of the river,
which object is attached to the bed of the river or to the B shore.
It has been held in a number of cases that where the middle of the main channel of the river has
been fixed as the territorial boundary and where concurrent jurisdiction was granted with reference to
the apprehensions of criminals "on the waters of the river" that State A might prosecute for conduct
condemned by its laws although committed by defendant on State B's side of the river. Brown v. State,
io9 Ark. 373, 159 S.W. 1132 (1913); State v. Moyers, X55 Iowa 678, 136 N. W. 896 (1912); Lemore v.
Commonwealth, 127 Ky. 480, 105 S. W. 930 (1907); State v. Cunningham, so2 Miss. 237, 59 So. 76
(192); State v. Kurtz, 317 Mo. 380, 295 S.W. 747 (1927); State v. Metcalf, 65 Mo. App. 681 (t896);
State v. Seagraves, Ii Mo. App. 353, 85 S. W. 925 (19o5). The holdings of the cases construing these
compacts and admissive Acts turn for the most part on what is meant by jurisdiction "over the river"
or "on the river," and discussion of them is not justified in this article. The leading cases, other than
those cited immediately above, are: Wedding v. Meyler, X92 U. S. 573, 24 Sup. Ct. 322 (1904); Nielson
v. Oregon, 212 U. S. 315, 29 Sup. Ct. 383 (19o9); McGowan v. Columbia River Packers Ass'n, 245 U. S.
352, 38 Sup. Ct. I29 (1917); Miller v. McLaughlin, 281 U. S. 261, 50 Sup. Ct. 296 (1930); State v.
Mullen, 35 Iowa 199 (1872); State v. George, 6o Minn. 503, 63 N. W. oo (1895); People v. C. R. R.
of N. J., 42 N. Y. 283 (1870); Ferguson v. Ross, 126 N. Y. 459, 27 N. E. 954 (1891); Roberts v. Fullerton, 117Wis. 222, 93 N. 'V. ss1s (1903).
'Public, No. 293, 73rd Cong., 2nd Sess. (1934), 18 U. S. C. A. (Supp. 1934) §420.
'°H.
R. Rep. 1137, accompanying H. R. 7353, 73rd Cong., 2nd Sess. (1934).
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It has been intimated by some that this statute gives to the states no more power
than they already had before its enactment, and that, under this Act, Congress contemplated that whatever agreements were entered into between the states in the
form of compacts would have to be subsequently approved by separate resolutions of
Congress before they would become effective. It is difficult to see how such an
interpretation can be placed upon the Act. The Constitution makes valid an interstate compact only with the consent of Congress. Heretofore that consent has been
given through a resolution approving a usually specific, but sometimes a very broad,
proposal of the states. It would seem that the only interpretation which would give
the present Act any significance whatever is one which regards the Act as a blanket
endorsement in advance by Congress of any compact into which the states might
enter in the field specified by the Act, viz.: "the prevention of crime and the enforcement of their respective criminal laws and policies"; and that as soon as the contracting states, through their legislatures, approve the agreement it becomes, from the
date of the second state's approval, a binding compact. If otherwise interpreted, the
Act is nothing more than a polite invitation on the part of Congress to the states to
agree on compacts and submit them later to Congress for approval-something the
states have been doing occasionally over a period of many years. A blanket consent
statute is not a new idea. Such a statute was contemplated in 1921 by the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws; 1 and the Compact Act, as here interpreted, has a
direct precedent in a resolution of the Congress12 which is a broad advance endorsement of any compacts subsequently entered into by any states in the fields of conservation of forests and water supply and the protection of forests from fire.
The following subjects for compacts under the Interstate Compact Act have been
suggested:
i. A compact giving authority to the officers of the enacting state to cross the
state line, continue pursuit in the coSperating state, and there arrest a suspected
criminal.
2. A compact giving authority to the officers of the enacting state to serve criminal process (not hot pursuit cases) issued by the enacting state, and directing its
officers to arrest, in the coperating state, one who has committed crime in the
former.
3. A compact giving authority to the officers of the enacting state to return a
fugitive, after he has been arrested in the cobperating state, to the enacting state,
without following the customary rendition procedure, or
4. A compact giving to the cobperating state authority to expel to the enacting
state, a person arrested in the former's jurisdiction, without the necessity of following the customary rendition procedure.
'Committee

on Inter-State Compacts, Report, NAT. CONF. COMM. UN. STrAE LAws, HANDBOOK AND
par. 3).
1236 STAT. 96i (1911).

PROCEEDINOS, 1921, 297, at 334 (§xg,
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5. A compact (or better, perhaps, a uniform reciprocal statute) providing for the
securing of out-of-state witnesses for attendance at criminal trials.
6. A compact giving authority to the enacting state to try persons for certain
offenses which are committed in the coperating state but which take effect in the
enacting state, or are partly committed in the latter, or are committed so close to a
boundary line that it is impossible to tell in which jurisdiction the offense was actually
committed.
7. A compact authorizing a state to expel, or the demanding state to retake,
parole violators, escapees, or persons on probation who either do not come within the
"fugitive from justice" classification under the rendition laws, or who should be
retaken by a procedure simpler than that afforded by such laws.
8. A compact giving authority to States A and B to maintain jointly a bureau of
identification and investigation, a crime laboratory, a joint police unit or border
patrol.
9. A compact giving authority to the enacting state to return persons wanted in
the coiperating state who have committed crime in the former but who are not
"fugitives" under the judicial interpretation of the rendition laws.
1o. A compact whereby one state would agree to supervise parolees released by
another state upon the latter's agreement to supervise parolees released from the first
state.
There are probably many other possible and justifiable uses for compacts in aid
of law enforcement. The remainder of this article, however, will be devoted to a
discussion of certain fields concerning which compacts will, in all probability, be
made use of in the very near future.
Compacts Providingfor the Arrest of Persons Who Have
Fled Across State Lines
It seems to be generally assumed by laymen, as well as by many lawyers and police
officials, that when a peace officer of one state, in pursuit of a fleeing criminal, arrives
at the state line, he is entirely without authority to cross the line and make an arrest
in a neighboring state. The assumption, for the most part, is not justified. A policeman of one jurisdiction who crosses the line into another jurisdiction does not thereby
lose all legal right to make an arrest. "He sheds his uniform and badge, figuratively
speaking, and becomes a private person with the same right to make arrests as any
other private individual."'13 In over thirty states a private person may lawfully arrest
if he knows that a felony has been committed and has reasonable ground to believe
that the man he arrests has committed it.' 4 In all of the states 5 except Texas,' 0
which permits arrest without warrant only when the offense is committed in the
' WAITE, THE CRIMINAL LAW

IN AcTOiN (1934), 267, 268.
L. Inst., 1930) pp. 238 elscq. (annotation to §22).

'MODEL CODE CRIM. PROC. (Am.

5 Id.
TEx. CODE CrM.PROC. (Vernon, 1925) art. 212; Lacey v. State, 7 Tex. Grim. App. 403 (879).
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person's presence, a private individual may arrest if he has reasonable ground to
believe that the person arrested is guilty, and if such person is in fact guilty, of a
felony. "The only privilege the state policeman loses when he crosses the line is the
privilege of making a reasonable mistake. And in two-thirds of the states he is
still allowed a reasonable mistake"17 as to who committed the crime, if he is right
in believing that a crime was in fact committed. "Indeed the Pennsylvania State
policeman, for instance, who pursues a supposed robber into Ohio has the same
authority to arrest him there as though the state line had not been crossed.... There
is no need for a state policeman in hot pursuit to stop at a State boundary."' 8
While this right on the part of officers of a foreign state to arrest without warrant
in the foreign state undoubtedly exists, it is not customarily exercised, either because
of the popular assumption above referred to that all of the officer's rights cease at the
boundary, or because in thirty states he loses the right to make a bad guess whether
a felony has in fact been committed, or because in all states if the act committed
should turn out to be a misdemeanor he would have no right to arrest unless the
act was committed in his presence.
It has been suggested, therefore, that an effective administration of justice requires
some provision whereby the officers of the state from which a suspect has fled could,
either with or without the authority and co~peration of the officers of the asylum
state, be granted the same right to arrest that they would have if the arrest were
made in their own state. The following statute proposed in 1921 by the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, 19 while not dealing strictly with the hot pursuit
situation, is interesting in this connection:
Section i. Serving Process without the State for Offence Committed within it. Criminal process issued under the authority of the State of [enacting State] against any person

accused of an offense committed within the State may be served in any county within the
State of [co6perating State], unless such person shall be under arrest by virtue of process

or authority of the State of [co~perating] State.
Section 2. Same. Criminal process issued under the authority of the State of [co~perating State] against any person accused of an offense committed within that State may
be served in any county within the State of [enacting State], unless such person shall be
under arrest by virtue of process or authority of the State of [enacting State.]

An interstate treaty which contains provisions along this line is the one first
enacted in 1882 between the United States and Mexico and renewed periodically
thereafter. 2 ° The problem of providing by compact some procedure for arrest of a
fugitive in a neighbor state is comparatively simple from the legal standpoint. The
real difficulties arise in establishing a workable administrative system in which frictions and jealousies will be reduced to a minimum. A procedure for arrest which
might be inserted in compacts is suggested later on in this article.2 ' A problem
closely linked with arrest procedure is that of the return of the person after arrest.
NV
WAITE,

op. cit. supra note 13.
is Id.
Committee on Inter-State Compacts, supra note xx, at 342.
,Id. at 319.
'See infra p. 468.
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Compacts For the Return of Criminals Found in Another State
We may safely assume that an officer of one state who makes an arrest in a
neighboring state is not empowered, under existing laws, to return his captive to the
state from which he has fled if the fugitive is unwilling to return, without first
obtaining authorization from the governor of the asylum state, such authorization
being granted only after a showing, required by the congressional enactment relating
to interstate rendition, that the person is a fugitive from justice, that he is charged
with a crime in the demanding state, and that a demand has been made by the
executive of that state for his return. The Constitution of the United States 22
provides that
A Person charged in any State with Treason, Felony, or other Crime, who shall flee
from Justice, and be found in another State, shall, on demand of the executive authority of
the State from which he fled, be delivered up, to be removed to the State having Jurisdiction of the crime.
Since this provision is not self-executing, Congress, in 1793, enacted an interstate
23
rendition statute which elaborates slightly upon the constitutional provision.
It is important to note, in connection with interstate compacts designed to set up
a simpler and more effective method for the return of persons fleeing across state
lines, that both the constitutional provision and the congressional act passed in
pursuance thereof do nothing more than establish a duty on the part of the asylum
state to comply with the demand of the executive of the demanding state for the
return of the fugitive. The constitutional provision and the federal statute merely
state when the asylum state must act but leave untouched the question when it may
act. One reason perhaps why no less formal machinery has been developed in the
various states is that the courts have regarded the authority of the governor to surrender a person as commensurate with the duty imposed upon him by the constitu24
tional provision, the congressional act, and the state laws relating to rendition.
If the governor has no authority to act with reference to the surrender of a fugitive,
that is, where no statute has been passed giving him such authority, the arrest of a
fugitive would be beyond his power. A large body of state legislation has been
enacted in aid of the present federal law.25 Some of this legislation has gone beyond
2
the federal law in providing for arrest of the fugitive prior to any requisition
With reference to such legislation, Justice Brandeis has said:27
These provisions of the Constitution and federal statutes [relating to interstate rendition] do not deal with arrest in advance of a requisition. They do not limit the power of
a State to arrest, within its borders, a citizen of another State for a crime committed elsewhere; nor do they prescribe the manner in which such arrest may be made. These arc
= U. S. CONsr. art. 4, §2, cl.2.
3' STAT. 302 (793), 18 U. S. C. A. §662.
"Note (1927) 41 HAv. L. Rav. 74, 75.
Probably every state now has some law relating to interstate rendition.
"'Vs. STAT. (1929) §§364.o6-364.07; TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC. (Vernon, 1925) 999-1003; VA. COne
ANN. (Michie, 1930) §§5o62-65. Note (1932) 32 COLUM. L. REV. 1411, at 1414.
'Burton v. N. Y. Central R. R., 245 U. S.315, 318, 38 Sup. Ct. 1o8, 109 (1917).
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matters left wholly to the individual States. Whether the asylum State shall make an
arrest in advance of requisition; and if so, whether it may be made without a warrant, are
matters which each State decides for itself. Such has been the uniform practice, sanctioned
by a long line of decisions and regulated by legislation in many of the States ...
It must be conceded that state enactments which are inconsistent with the federal
rendition law would be unconstitutional. On the other hand, the enactment of the
federal rendition law in no way prevented the states from either enacting auxiliary
legislation whereby the federal rendition machinery might more easily function or
enacting laws which set up a simpler system of interstate rendition, provided that
such laws in no way interfere with the duty constitutionally imposed upon asylum
states to honor requisitions where certain prerequisites are met by demanding
executives. It is submitted that the only instance in which a state law could be
regarded as inconsistent with the constitutional provision would be where such state
law lessened or detracted from this constitutional duty. If, by compact, two states
provided for some simple unconventional procedure for the return of fugitives, such
compact could not be said to interfere in any way with the duty of the governor of
an asylum state to return a fugitive in the event that such fugitive is demanded, as
under traditional rendition machinery, by the governor of the demanding state. A
rule to the effect that food may be passed without command from the head of the
table is not inconsistent with a rule that it must be passed when so commanded.
Again, inasmuch as the Constitution speaks in terms of one who has fled from
justice, it is submitted that the states, retaining as they do all powers not granted
away and embodied in the United States Constitution, would have the right to set
up a procedure for the return of persons who have committed crime in one jurisdiction and are found in another but who are not strictly "fugitives from justice" within
the meaning of the judicial decisions construing the congressional statute. This
argument is well developed by Judge A. H. Reid in an address before the American
Bar Association in 1920.2 s
If the intent of the framers of the constitutional provision is persuasive, it may be
said that the history of the constitutional provision indicates that demand by the
executive was not intended to be exclusive. In fact, rendition between executives
seems to have been a new procedure when it first appeared in the Articles of Confederation.29 In 1789, for instance, Chief Justice Brearly of New Jersey wrote to
Governor Mifflin of Pennsylvania that the powers given by the Articles of Confederation to the state executive were "not necessary to be exercised in ordinary cases." 30
A simple reading of the constitutional provision, taken together with the history
of interstate rendition, indicates that the provision was inserted in the Constitution
simply to assure each state that (regardless of what other methods for the return
I

InterstateExtradition for Extra-territorialCrimes (1920) 45 A. B. A. REP. 432, at 440-442.
22 MOORE, EXTRADITION (1891) 821; 2 WINTHROP, HISTORy OF NEW ENGLAND (Hosmer's ed. i9o8)
126; Hoague, Extradition Between States (x878) 13 Amt. L. REv. 181, 2O.
*oMOORE, op. ct., supra note 29, 824.
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of fugitives might be used) if demand were made by an executive upon another state
for the return of a fugitive, the demand would be honored. It was not intended as
a pronouncement that fugitives could be returned only upon executive demand. The
congressional statute simply fills in the details showing when the duty exists and
what showing should be made by the demanding executive before the duty arises
on the part of the asylum state. It seems clear that the states still retain their right
to set up any procedure for the return of persons wanted for crime, so long as it in
no way detracts from the duty imposed upon a state when a demand does happen
to be made by an executive for the return of a fugitive, and so long as such procedure
does not conflict with the requirements of due- process of law.
Various simpler methods for the return of persons wanted for crime have been
suggested. Canadian practice whereby a warrant of one province, when endorsed
by a magistrate of another, is a valid instrument in the second province for arrest
and removal, 3 ' has been recommended. A procedure, similar to that under the
federal removal statute,3 2 has also been suggested.
A method for the arrest and return of wanted criminals, which might be inserted
in interstate compacts, is suggested here in outline form.
i. An officer of enacting state in hot pursuit or armed with a warrant of arrest
issued by the enacting state should have the authority to arrest a person wanted for
a crime committed in the enacting state who has fled to the co6perating state, and
should have power to make that arrest either
(a) alone and without the knowledge of the co6perating state or its officials, or
(b) (perhaps a better alternative) in co6peration with some official (from a
class to be designated in the compact, such as sheriffs), or
(c) (perhaps even a better alternative) on the authorization of an officer or
other official (from a class of officials to be designated in the compact), such an
authorization to be almost an automatic one and communicable orally as by
telephone, or otherwise.
2. Under such compact the officers of the enacting state should be required to
take the arrested person before the nearest magistrate, (or, better perhaps, before the
nearest judge having original jurisdiction over major felony cases), and
3. On a showing before such magistrate that either
(a) the arrest was made in hot or continuous pursuit and that the officer of
the enacting state had reasonable grounds to believe that a crime under the laws
of the enacting state had been committed in such state, and reasonable ground to
believe that the apprehended person committed it, or
(b) that the officers of the enacting state possess a warrant valid on its face
for the arrest of the person apprehended,
4. Then the court, on such showing, should order the apprehended person placed
in the custody of the officers of the enacting state to be returned to such state without
further proceedings.
'CAN.

CRIm. CODE §662.

1 STAT. 91 (1789) as amended, 18 U. S. C. A. §59x.
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Of course, provisions as to the arrest of escapees, persons jumping bail following

conviction and pending appeal, persons on probation, and parole violators (all persons who have already been tried and convicted) should require ample proof identifying the fugitive (such as fingerprints) and proof of his conviction and escape from
confinement, or in the case of a parolee or probationer that his parole or probation

has been revoked. The more simple the method of return the more subject to abuse
it is likely to become, and this must be constantly kept in mind in the drawing up
of state compacts in this field.
Compacts to Secure the Attendance of Non-Resident Witnesses in
Criminal Cases
The problem presented by the absence of any legal procedure whereby nonresident witness may be required to attend criminal trials is a challenge to those
persons anxious to establish substantial improvement in our criminal procedure by
the compact device. A witness as such cannot be extradited. In 1931 the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws approved a "Uniform Act to Secure the Attendance
of Witnesses From Without the State in Criminal Cases." This important law is
34
digested in the footnote below.3 3 Since 1931 six states have adopted this Uniform
3
Act, which was modeled in part after a New York statute enacted in I9o2. ' Similar
3
legislation of much earlier origin had been enacted in the New England states

6

37
Up to the time of the promulgation of the Uniform Act ten states had adopted

' Section i, entitled "Summoning Witness in this State to Testify in Another State," provides for the
issuance of a summons by a court in the enacting state requiring a person certified to be a material witness
in a criminal prosecution in another state (if it also has made provision for the return of witnesses) to
attend and testify in the latter state on pain of contempt. Such summons shall issue only after a hearing
at which it is shown that the witness is material and necessary, that the distance to the place of trial does
not exceed iooo miles, and that the states through and to which the witness must travel will give him
protection from civil and criminal process. The witness thus summoned must be paid in advance mileage
of ten cents per mile and five dollars for each day he is required to travel and attend as a witness.
Section 2, entitled "Witness from Another State summoned to Testify in this State," authorizes the
issuance of a certificate by a court of the enacting state in which a criminal prosecution is pending
stating that a person then in another state (which also has made provision for the return of witnesses) is
wanted as a material witness in such prosecution for a specified number of days. Such certificate is to
be presented to a court of record in the county where the witness then is. The witness must be tendered
the same mileage and compensation as is provided above and shall not be required to remain within the
enacting state beyond the period of time stated in the certificate.
Section 3, entitled "Exemption from Arrest and Service of Process," exempts a witness summoned to
the enacting state or passing through that state in obedience to a summons from another state from service
of criminal or criminal process in connection with matters which arose before his entrance as witness.
Section 4 enjoins interpretation of the Act in the interests of uniformity. Sections 5, 6, and 7 are
formal in character.
In The Problem of the Fugitive Felon and Witness by Messrs. Toy and Shepherd, the authors question
the adequacy of a statute of this character where the only sanction is contempt proceedings. See p. 420
supra.

" Maine, Nevada, New York, North Dakota, South Dakota, Wisconsin. See 9 UN. Lhws ANN. (Supp.
i933) 6.
nN. Y. CODE CRIM. PRoC. (Gilbert, i933) §618a.
'For a discussion of these statutes, see Interstate Extradition of Witnesses (I 9o2) 6 LAW NoTES (N.
Y.) 159.

"Connecticut, Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York, Rhode Island, South Dakota,
Vermont and Wisconsin. See 9 UN. LAws ANN. (Supp. 1933) 7.
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statutes somewhat similar to the New York law of

1902.

Both the New York statute

and the Uniform Act are reciprocal in their nature. They are not compacts in the
sense that there is a mutual agreement between any two or more states to adopt a
particular procedure. The only case which has construed any of these statutes is
the case of Commonwealth of Massachusetts v. Klaus."8 In this case the majority
of the court sustained the constitutionality of the New York statute of X902, most of
the argument being directed to the right of a state to require its citizens to go out of
the state to testify in criminal trials in other states. A strong dissenting opinion, 9
however, insisted that a reciprocal law of this type is the equivalent of, if not, a
compact, within the meaning of the United States Constitution, and that inasmuch
as the consent of Congress had not been obtained the statute was invalid. This
argument of the dissenting judge was not rebutted or even touched upon in the
majority opinion, yet it is submitted that there is much to be said for this view. The
legislation is reciprocal and operative only if another state also acts. It is an agreement by the state to do certain things which, apart from the statute, it is not compelled to do and which are to the benefit, in part, of another jurisdiction. It is fairly
conceivable, therefore, that the courts will regard such uniform legislation as coming
within the meaning of the word "compact." If such legislation is a compact, it is
unconstitutional unless congressional approval is secured. The Interstate Compact
Act of the Seventy-third Congress would certainly not give retroactive approval to
such statutes, although it would sanction similar statutes which may be enacted in
the future.
But it is submitted that uniform legislation rather than separate compacts would
be much more likely to accomplish results in this field. The procedure would be
more simple; interpretations of the Uniform Act would be persuasive authority in
all jurisdictions which had adopted it; and scores of independent treaties, differing
40
perhaps in their terminology, could thus be avoided.
The absence of state laws providing for the rendition of witnesses in criminal cases
was, in part, responsible for the so-called Fugitive Felon Law 4' of the last Congress
which declared it a federal crime for a person to cross state lines in order to avoid
giving testimony in a felony case. This Act, in effect, makes available federal removal machinery where interstate rendition is not available. But such a statute can
be regarded only as a temporary expedient, to be used until such time as the states,
by compact or uniform law, shall provide for the return of witnesses who have left
the trial jurisdiction. This is a duty which clearly devolves upon the states.

3s
145 App.

Div. 798, 13o N. Y. Supp. 713 (191).
'Commonwealth of Massachusetts v. Klaus, 13o N. Y. Supp. at 718.
"oThe late Professor Freund, formerly Commissioner of Illinois on Uniform State Laws, said (Committee on Inter-State Compacts, supra note ii, at 359): ". . . Where reciprocity is to operate between a
great many of the states the compact method is so cumbersome that the method now prevailing [uniform
reciprocal legislation] though theoretically less perfect, is more convenient."
"Public, No. 233, 73rd Cong., 2nd Sess. (1934), 18 U. S. C. A. (Supp. 1934) §4o8c. This statute is
discussed in Toy and Shepherd, The Problem of the Fugitive Felon and Witness, supra, p. 415.

THE INTERSTATE COMPAcT-A DEivcE FOR CRImE REPRESSION

Compacts for the Supervision of Paroleesand Probationers
The success of a parolee or probationer is dependent largely upon his surroundings. If he can be returned to his home where sympathetic friends can give him
the needed encouragement and employment, there is a greater likelihood of his
rehabilitation. But if he is convicted in one jurisdiction, and his home is in another,
the problem of supervision arises; and an intelligent supervision is likewise an essential factor in rehabilitation. In many parts of the country this problem has been met
by informal agreements between various municipalities and states. Such agreements
have not, however, assumed the form of compacts or treaties.
It is now being urged that this is an appropriate field for interstate compacts,
under which State A would agree to place its supervisory agencies at the disposal
of State B's parolees or probationers, provided that State B would undertake the same
with reference to parolees or probationers of State A. Under the compact, a basis
for apportioning costs could easily be worked out to meet the situation where the
number of persons sent by one state exceeds the number sent by the other. In a field
such as this where much detail would be involved it is likely that the establishment
by compact of a permanent joint commission by the states interested would prove
most satisfactory. Such a compact might first be entered into by a very limited
number of states which now possess high standards of supervision. The compact
might provide that additional states could become parties thereto by meeting the
standards set by the joint commission. This would undoubtedly tend to raise
standards in the various states.
Whether the subjects for compacts discussed herein represent fields in which
compacts are most needed is, of course, debatable. At least, these are the fields in
which the compact device is most apt to be employed in the near future. These fields
certainly present problems which are beyond a single state's power to meet, and yet
they are problems which, for reasons of policy, or because of constitutional limitations, the federal government alone should not assume. When a problem can be
said to fall in this intermediate category the likelihood is strong that it may be
effectively met by the instrumentality of an interstate compact.

